October 17 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The movie below is written and directed by Peter Joseph. It is 123 min long and offers a lot of food-for-thought. We welcome your comments.

Posted in Identity Management, Security Measures, Health Preparedness, Economic Issues, In The News, Water Issues, Food Security, Africa, Asia, North America, South America, Environment, Politics | No Comments »

April 3 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

There was a lot of buzz in the media this morning around Canada’s growing diversity. A lot of hype, but few questions and serious analyses. Our eagerness to splash statistics attesting to our changing social fabric without assessment of what these figures mean is but another example of an inability in Canada to think critically and strategically. It’s as if an issue arises and we, as a result of the lenses we are told to look through, become timid, subdued and afraid to ask any questions for fear of being perceived as against the mainstream. Prevailing mentalities in this country are so strong that we have successfully quashed any chance of engaging each other in much needed dialogue about the future of this country. Case in point - in the context of diversity why isn’t anyone asking about the future of Canadian identity?

Analysing diversity beyond how it is increased or better manifested in the workplace seems to be patently un-Canadian. We’re told that, as Canadians, we are a nice people, an accepting people. Indeed, I would venture so far as to say that we are a tolerant people. Little analysis, however, has been done as to whether this tolerance was bred from a genuine understanding for the things and people of which we are accepting or from a slow suffocation of unsavoury opinions and biases that far from having been eradicated seethe somewhere beneath the surface. It’s an ugly question and we, nice Canadians, don’t seem to be willing to entertain it.

It’s likely that we arrived at our current tolerance through a mix of both approaches, but our fear of analysing the way in which we did come to it renders us mute, unable to tackle any wider issues associated with accommodation.

Although there was much talk today about the considerable increase in visible minorities, there was startlingly little discourse on how immigration impacts a greater sense of Canadian identity and thus community. No one seemed prepared to ask how the 1,109,980 people who immigrated to Canada between 2001 and 2006 integrated into Canadian society. Sure, there is concern over discrimination of the 83.9% of those immigrants who are from “non-European countries”, but there is little consideration of what is being done by immigrants to reach out to the rest of Canada. It’s as if we have developed a mentality that the smaller group is by default a victim and, as a result, the larger group is responsible alone for accommodation - so much so that asking many questions has become unacceptable.

Another reason why questions aren’t being asked is because in recent years there hasn’t been a problem. Many Diasporas already have established communities into which new immigrants are absorbed. (Brampton is perhaps the poster-city for such settlement.) Integration becomes a non-issue; migrants are essentially just moving from country to country while remaining in the same wider community. What sort of impact does this “enclaving” have on the wider Canadian community? Does the sense of community fostered in ethnic enclaves overshadow that which should be forged as a country? Could the network maintained by ethnic communities across borders (for example a group spread across Canada, the U.S., the U.K and South Asia) impact national interests and if so, how? Are we moving towards creating a ‘global identity’ where borders don’t matter anymore? By the way, with increasing global communications and examples offered by regional supra-national bodies such the European Union where a ‘European identity’ is being forged as we speak, the latter proposition is no longer a matter of vision but reality.

If, however, we’re still talking about a ‘Canadian identity’ then the subject must be addressed head on. What does Canadian identity actually mean and what purpose does the notion serve? If it is meant to define a group of people as ‘something that we are’, then it has to include a clear articulation of what do we, as a community, stand for and represent, which inevitably connects with a wider question: what are our interests? A clear articulation of this will provide the best indication, locally and globally, of what Canada is all about. It will also serve as the best indicator of what Canada can offer to the wider world. If the notion is meant to define a group as ‘something that we are not’, then the on-going debate in Canada about how different we are (or not) from our neighbours to the south may be sufficient for everyone.

The same statistics that provide immigration numbers also point to a growing urban-rural divide in Canada which may further complicates the future of a Canadian identity. Given that 96% of Canada’s visible minorities live in cities, what might be the associations made among an increasingly bitter rural population facing ever-more education and health care cutbacks, not to mention a lack of jobs? Economic troubles typically bring with them social divisions, hatred for those who are perceived to have what the others have not. Could those rural populations, which tend to feel more “ethnically” Canadian than those in urban centres, lash out against immigrant groups as a result? Apart from the rural-urban divide, what about relations between the immigrant communities themselves? Is anything being done to bring various ethnic groups together to prevent such divisions? Do we even consider the importance of perceptions in building or undermining stability?

In a country with a population of 31,241,030 only 4.3 million feel ethnically Canadian. Another 5.7 million see themselves as ethnically Canadian, but also consider themselves as having other ethnic origins. Being ethnically Canadian, mixed or not, is on the decline, down from 11.7 million in 2001 to just over 10 million. Just under 6.2 million are foreign-born. This leaves over 21 million people (nearly 15 million of which were born here) in Canada feeling that they are ethnically something other than Canadian. I suppose part of the reason this figure is so high is due to the definition of ethnicity (i.e. how do people define themselves), but I think it is also telling about a potential lack of Canadian identity. After all, ethnicity is perhaps one of the strongest identifiers for a group of people. Our continued focus on breaking down the population by ethnic groups or visible minorities only helps entrench past ties, sometimes generations-old, with extra-national groups. Hardly the stuff national identities are made out of.

Sure, diversity is great. When cultures do come together, truly integrating and co-operating as a whole not just living side-by-side in respective communities, considerable progress can be made. With all of our focus on ethnic statistics and hiring quotas, however, it seems that Canada isn’t really succeeding in developing that wider national community necessary for really capitalizing on its diversity. Indeed, it’s as if we can’t see the need for wider integrated community (read: forest) as a result of our distraction by ethnic diversity (read: trees).

Posted in Identity Management, North America | No Comments »

April 1 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The following article by Jean Christou published in the Cyprus Mail is a must read. Providing an insightful perspective on the unsettling, not mention unnecessary, direction in which security is headed, Jean draws from traveller anecdotes, links to which have been added here.

TRAVELLING back to Cyprus on a British Airways flight from London recently, I had a run-in with a flight attendant over a pair of headphones. As a regular sufferer during depressurisation before landing, I listen to music, which helps my ears to cope with the sometimes excruciating pain.

Aware of the rules about using CD players on take-off and landing, I always use a non-digital tape recorder and leave it on until the plane reaches around 10,000 feet, some ten minutes before hitting the runway and so posing no danger to the aircraft, or so I thought.

I saw the stewardess coming, and instead of trying to explain all this, I switched it off, unplugged the phones from the machine, but left them on my head as they still helped. Predictably she asked me to remove them. I showed her the wire attached only to fresh air. She was having none of it and insisted I take them off. I asked her why. The answer was essentially: “Just because”.

I told her she was paranoid. She stomped off. If she had given a logical explanation such as the heavily padded phones could… umm… damage my head in a crash landing, I would have complied.

Then of course I would have been compelled to ask her why other passengers were not being asked to remove their hairbands, glasses and jewellery, and also perhaps whether a crash landing was imminent by any chance.

The point of this diatribe? Not the non-logic of airport and airline rules – although some of them might qualify – but the lack of common sense and worse, in those tasked with implementing those rules.

So far in Cyprus we have escaped horrors like those perpetrated on passengers by some officials in the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA), but if the EU starts stepping up its security under the new convergence agreement with Washington, running into these kinds of power-tripping individuals will be inevitable.

Just last month in the US, a 37-year old woman was made to remove her nipple rings with a pair of pliers in front of sniggering TSA staff because for some unimaginable reason they posed a security threat. After the humiliation, they allowed her to board her flight…while still wearing the same kind of ring in her navel. Breasts probably are more dangerous than navels when you think about it, and probably more titillating too, but that’s just a coincidence.

Another incident saw a pregnant woman made to lift up her shirt in front of other passengers to prove her condition because terrorists might just hide a bomb in a pregnancy suit. Yes it’s a possibility, but when the crying woman’s husband took issue with a female TSA agent for feeling up his wife’s breasts, he was thrown in the airport jail and later charged and taken to court for shouting abuse at TSA staff. The video tape of what actually happened had conveniently disappeared.

In an even worse case, a woman who was carrying a sippy cup with water for her toddler was told to hand it over. She needed the cup for the child for the flight ahead and offered to drink the water. She was told she could but would have to come back through security again with the empty cup. As she was being escorted back, she accidentally spilled the water. She was threatened with arrest “for endangering other passengers” with the spilled water and told to clean it up.

“I was ordered to apologise for the spilled water, and again threatened with arrest. I was threatened several times with arrest. A total of four police officers and three TSA officers reported to the scene where I was being held. I was also told that I should not disrespect the officer and could be arrested for this too. I apologised to the officer and she continued to detain me, despite me telling her that I would miss my flight. The officer advised me that I should have thought about this before I ‘intentionally spilled the water!’”

There is an endless list of such incidents, and more than 7,000 complaints are currently pending against the TSA, which is part of Homeland Security. This includes complaints by people who are listed for extra checks and those not allowed to fly at all. The TSA currently has 900,000 names on its “watch list”. That translates into almost a million potential ‘terrorists’. Yet according to recent figures, screeners failed to find 75 per cent of dummy explosives in 70 tests at LA airport, and those at Chicago failed to spot 60 per cent. No doubt they were too busy harassing members of the public over bottles of water or groping their breasts.

That’s not to say airport security is a bad thing, or that all TSA staff are sadists and perverts. Security is absolutely necessary, but what has become unacceptable is the way fare-paying passengers are treated, and the way we allow ourselves to be treated, queuing up like cattle to be herded together by power-trippers in uniforms. And more than 7,000 complaints do not constitute ‘isolated incidents’. But we just take it all lying down because it’s often hard to argue on personal privacy issues when it comes to the greater good.

How do you answer when the obedient citizens spout the: “I have nothing to hide” argument as they bend over for the uniforms.

Daniel J. Solove Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School suggests those who value their privacy should respond: “So you don’t have curtains then?” or “I don’t have anything to hide. But I don’t have anything I feel like showing you, either.”

Solove says the right to privacy recognises the sovereignty of the individual, but that most people associate it with hiding bad things about themselves. “The harms [here] consist of those created by bureaucracies – indifference, errors, abuses, frustration, and lack of transparency and accountability,” he says.

In other words the problem lies not with the surveillance and checks themselves, which are legitimate enough at times, but in the flawed or even malicious interpretation of the information and how it can be used against someone if an airport or airline employee is having a bad hair day or doesn’t like your face… or even your headphones.

Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2008

Posted in Identity Management, Security Measures, North America, Europe, Politics | No Comments »

March 31 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The CIA chief, Michael Hayden, has reportedly told NBC that terrorists are using “operatives that…wouldn’t attract your attention if they were going through the customs line at Dulles  with you.” In other words, the new terrorist will look as Western as any citizen of North America. This should have been expected, particularly after the U.S. began using racial profiling as a border security measure; the next logical step in facilitating the crossing of potential terrorists at borders would be to use people who would never cause a red flag to be raised.

As with previous statements by CIA representatives regarding the vulnerability of power grids in North America, I’m left wondering at the quality of intelligence that they choose to share with the public. It’s as if the organization has been stockpiling the most obvious vulnerabilities or threat adaptations to security measures for release some 4 to 5  years after the bit of ‘intelligence,’ (if something so elementary can even be called that,) should have been news. Is the CIA trying to give the illusion that it is informing the public? Any thinking person should have been able to surmise this change in tactic for moving operatives across borders years ago.

It all comes back to the fundamental problem of using identity as the basis for security measures. Sure, keeping track of law abiding citizens is facilitated by identity management on a national scale; to such people the idea of abusing the system is outside their realm of contemplation. Preventing threats, such as terrorists, from crossing borders with identity based security measures isn’t so likely. In order to stop such a person from passing through a border check point, one would have to be aware that the target in fact poses a threat. Thus, only if the person is known to have committed a crime and can be firmly linked to the identity under which that crime was committed will such a suspect be apprehended.

Of course, an alert and well-trained border guard could detect slight peculiarities in a subject’s behaviour that might tip the agent off, thus escalating the case in the required 60-seconds or less. Our growing penchant for throwing technology at security problems, however, is making this scenario less and less likely all the time as we opt for automated kiosks to scan passports, manned by travellers far from the prying eyes of such adept officials.

Terrorists, and indeed organized criminals, understand how the system works.  In fact, it is generally accepted that such threats are already steps ahead of the security industry - particularly in the use of technology. Organized crime rings have readily adopted advanced technology, just as any other business has, greatly improving the efficiency of their operations. College ICT students have become prime candidates for working with such criminal organizations, particularly in regions where legitimate jobs  in the field are few or compensation is poor. If there is a way to forge hi-tech identity documents, I’m pretty sure that organized crime rings have already figured it out.

It isn’t the technological nature of enhanced identity-based national security measures which presents terrorists and mobsters with an opportunity to breach the walls of Fortress America, however; it’s the inherent flaws of the traditional system. Knowing that the system is designed to detect identifiable threats, i.e. known criminals or people who fit set profiles - for which there is none available for a terrorist - why would any well-organized crime ring send anyone across a border that would raise alarm? They wouldn’t. As a result, look for middle-class, Caucasian North Americans disgruntled by a lack of options, crumbling economy and perhaps with the scars of some distant war to bear as a far more likely candidate for terrorism in the coming years.

All of this, of course, is to say nothing of the other ways in which identity-based border security measures can be breached, which advanced technological solutions have failed to address. Such tactics include bribing a corrupt official to issue a legitimate albeit false identity, establishing an official identity using supporting documents issued to a target but linked to a deceased citizen, and operating under a legitimate identity issued by another state for the purposes of espionage or terrorism.

It makes me wonder what the point of the Chief’s statement are. On one hand, if reading between the lines, Mr. Hayden has admitted that our current identity-based approaches won’t be sufficient for the changing tactics of terrorists. On the other hand, taking his statements at face value, the fact that we know terrorists understand how the system can be breached easily will likely only result in ever-more enhanced traditional security measures; measures that although already evidently not effective for preventive purposes, will undoubtedly come into more widespread use. Indeed, the middle class Caucasian might just have been given a new reason to be screened and monitored, even more than before. 

Posted in Wiretapping & Surveillance, Identity Management, Security Measures, North America, Middle East, Central Asia | No Comments »

March 25 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The RCMP decision to publicly release even less information around the use of tasers should come as no surprise. Just ask the simple question, to whom is the RCMP accountable?

Citing privacy concerns and on-going investigations, the RCMP has chosen to begin omitting the following information in public releases on the use of tasers:

• Whether the target was armed;
• The reason for firing the taser;
• What other tactics were employed before firing;
• The dates of firings;
• Related injuries as a result of the firing, including head traumas; and
• The duration of the shock sustained.

Although none of the above appears to be a real breach of privacy, should there be pending law suits there is an argument for the repression of some of the details as they relate to ongoing investigations only.

Such selective releasing of information will do little to help the beleaguered reputation of the RCMP. At a time when the public seems to be demanding ever more accountability from the boys in red, one would think that now, while the organization is being politically pinned up for reforms, that the RCMP would be disclosing more information, not less. Of course, such thinking relies upon the premise that the RCMP is a highly accountable organization with simple processes by which members of the public can ask questions, be answered and see changes to the system as a result. Naturally, not all public demands or requests can be reasonably accommodated given security, judicial or ‘greater good’ situations. However, in such cases a genuine attempt must be made to consider all matters and a viable explanation provided. Unfortunately, despite the very public announcements surrounding moves to reform the RCMP, the measures introduced so far smack of bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo and, as it has been the case across the board in governmental reforms, will do nothing in the end.

Just try to understand the measures enacted to reform the RCMP and your head will start spinning: A new reform council created as a result of a separate task force, applauded by a new commissioner (who to outsiders appears not to be part of the law enforcement establishment) all announced by, quite likely, an unsuspecting minister. It’s like a Canadian episode of “Yes, Minster!” but without the humour.

Let’s begin with the force’s reporting structure. The RCMP, as per the official website ”is headed by the Commissioner, who, under the direction of the Minister of Public Safety Canada, has the control and management of the Force and all matters connected therewith.” You might recall, that in July of 2007, a new commissioner was appointed; a man hailed as being the first person to take on the role with a background from outside of the RCMP. While that might be true, the image promoted of the career bureaucrat, William Elliott, is slightly misleading to those who don’t understand how Canada’s permanent bureaucracy works.

Mr. Elliott first began working in the government at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. Joining the Department of Justice in 1992, he worked there until being appointed as Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security, at Transport Canada in 2000. In 2003, Mr. Elliott was made Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence, in which role he supported the National Security Advisor (NSA) to the Prime Minister, until he was himself appointed as the NSA from 2005-2006.

The NSA, interestingly, is guided by the Advisory Council on National Security (ACNS), which in turn is comprised of a series of experts. For example, the current Council, which is chaired by Norman Inkster a former RCMP commissioner and president of Interpol, includes four former high-ranking police officers, four academics, two career bureaucrats and a few private sector representatives.

Thus, the current RCMP commissioner, who was once closely advised by former top-level law enforcement officers, is responsible for the “control and management of the Force and all matters connected therewith.” Mr. Elliott does report publicly to the Minister of Public Safety, Stockwell Day, who as a result is politically held accountable for the RCMP.

Mr. Day, like most of our representatives, is a career politician. As such, he relies on advice and guidance to make decisions on security measures. First among those advisers is a small group of political staff, which works for the minister. Unlike the ministerial offices of the Liberals, the Conservatives employee considerably fewer staff. Often, such advisors might not have experience in the subject matter they are covering and, as the adjective “political” implies, are focused on communications and public affairs.  As a result, these advisors rely upon information put forward by interested parties (read: interest groups), a smattering of concerned citizens and the permanent bureaucracy.

The only other source of information stems from the analysis put forward by non-profit organizations, such as think tanks, associations and universities, all of which receive considerable funding from the various departments and agencies asking for submissions. Furthermore, the new measures that were implemented to make the government more accountable limit those experts, which can be commissioned to conduct analysis and other studies, eliminating any private-sector individuals or organizations from partaking.

There is a propensity within bureaucracy to simply follow the status-quo. Thus, a culture of doing things in certain ways develops which continues unchallenged as all employed by the system are swept along with the bureaucratic tide. It would  also be interesting to see how many bureaucrats employed by the department of Public Safety are former law enforcement, intelligence or military personnel. Having had dealings with the department there appears to be a high rate of turn over between the security establishment and the bureaucracy, which could account for the often law enforcement-oriented security bills that are pushed forward by the permanent bureaucracy. 

The dominance by the law enforcement and intelligence establishment in all matters relating to security is evident in the appointments for the myriad of reform-focused bodies announced by Mr. Day following a series of RCMP scandals.

The Task Force (so called because a costly group of experts is assigned a task with a somewhat predetermined outcome, and thus host consultations to hear what concerns select, invited members of the public have on issues only to ignore what isn’t complementary to their goals in the final report of recommendations) on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP was created in July of 2007. Consisting of several former bureaucrats including Norman Inkster (who also advises the NSA, see above), the “Task Force” recommended the creation of yet another body, the RCMP Reform Implementation Council.

Trusting the recommendations put forward by the “Task Force,” Mr. Day recently announced the creation of the new reform council, which members include two private sector representatives, a career bureaucrat, and two former police officers, one being Beverley Busson, former RCMP commissioner and a member of the Advisory Council to the NSA (again see above).

It could be argued that in order to truly understand the issues at hand, these various bodies, boards and departments should have representatives from the law enforcement, intelligence and military communities. Such close ties between those communities and the people responsible for oversight should raise concerns as to how accountable organizations, such as the RCMP, actually are. Is it reasonable to assume that former law enforcement officers are the best source for creating, driving and overseeing security measures?

Of course, many on the inside will point to the oversight bodies that exist to ensure accountability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Indeed, as Insp. Troy Lightfoot, who helps oversee RCMP Taser use, said to the press recently “I can tell you that there are many accountability systems in place with regards to police actions. You have the courts, you have coroners’ inquests, you have a multitude of oversight bodies. There is a complaints process that can be followed.”

This oversight process, however, isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. A 2006 report entitled “Civilian Oversight of the RCMP’s National Security Functions” notes that most complaints must first be filed through the RCMP before reaching the Commission. Furthermore, the commission does not have the power to review the RCMP’s duties and functions or put forward binding recommendations that the RCMP would have to follow. In fact, none of the bodies, which provide oversight to our intelligence agencies, the RCMP, CSIS and CSE, have the power to present binding recommendations.

As with the appointed councils and advisors, there is also the question of who is tasked with the responsibility of oversight and review; what sort of background do they have? The current head of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP is Paul E. Kennedy. His 25-year bureaucratic career includes “roles as General Counsel for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service” or CSIS, after which he provided “expert advice and support to the Minister in relation to law enforcement and national security matters…In May of 2004, following the creation of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Mr. Kennedy was appointed as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister with responsibility for national security and emergency preparedness.” Undoubtedly, Mr. Kennedy has enjoyed the same sources of advice and insight as other high-ranking officials. That being said, Mr. Kennedy is considered to be somewhat a “thorn in the side” of the RCMP as he has been quite vocal on speaking up against the approaches of the organization.

Mr. Kennedy’s predecessor, Shirley Heafey,  hasn’t had much nice to say about her days as head of the Commission. As the Ottawa Citizen reported

“She had a “dreadful” time due to what she called “direct interference” by the Martin government with her independent role.

In allegations denied by former government officials, Ms. Heafey said she and her office were audited “to death” and there was an effort to forestall a public hearing by her commission into allegations that the Mounties covered up sexual abuse by an RCMP staff sergeant at the now-defunct Kingsclear youth training centre in New Brunswick.”

The political climate, and the high-level executives in the public service, really made my life extremely difficult,” she says in an exclusive interview with The Lawyers Weekly.”

The deputy prime minister’s office and the people in the Privy Council Office were quite concerned about the fact that I had to say what I had to say.”

Ms. Heafey contended “they made a lot of requests to me about the work I was doing (and) you know you don’t challenge the RCMP without accepting that you may have to pay a price. They are a national icon … and the government, in the last two years under Mr. (then-prime minister Paul) Martin, was very touchy about some of the things I did. They were trying to remind me to shut up.”

The Executive Director of the Security and Intelligence Review committee or SIRC leads all review of CSIS activities. The current Executive Director,Susan Pollak, began her career with another intelligence agency, CSE, moving to the Privy Council in 1984 and becoming the Principal advisor to the Deputy Clerk on Security and Intelligence in 1987.

The only current Commissioner responsible for any oversight of our intelligence and security agencies who doesn’t appear to have any direct background with the law enforcement or intelligence communities is Charles D. Gonthier. The current CSE Commissioner is an 80-year old lawyer from Quebec.

I suppose that at least some review is better than none. The Canada Border Services Agency, which will be increasingly collecting information on Canadian citizens as we move towards hi-tech identity documents, has no review mechanism according to the report.

And so there it is. The RCMP decides to release less information at the very time they are supposedly being pressed to be more transparent. Only, the people appointed to the unending layers of bureaucracy that are the commissions, task forces, councils, boards, departments and offices responsible for such reforms are often experts with a distinguished career inside law enforcement or intelligence agencies or are informed and advised by such people. Thus, instead of acting the part and appearing to be a changing organization coping with its issues, the RCMP behaves as it increasingly has – we are the law, if you’re not with us, you’re against us.

This isn’t a RCMP-specific problem, either. It’s more an endemic problem we are facing with a growing bureaucracy in this country. Until we begin to look at issues in security from a systemic perspective, which must include an assessment of the role of bureaucracy in developing, implementing and overseeing security measures, we will continue to have serious issues.  

As I mentioned in an article last week, the tradition of keeping the security profession a closed-in, insular looking field will negatively impact our state of security long-term. A stale bureaucratic outlook will only further complicate the matter. Furthermore, the reform of any single security organization cannot occur without a simultaneous revision of how both government and average Canadians approach the issue of Canada’s national security. It’s time to stop blinding ourselves with individual security issues and tools (such as wiretapping and tasers) and move onto a wider assessment of the state of security in Canada.

Considering the RCMP reforms, and indeed any reforms around security in this country, is a bit like peeling back the layers of an onion. On the surface, especially to an uninformed observer, the reforms and the bodies created to oversee them appear solid, devoid of any funny smell. Ask a few questions, peel back the layers and soon enough your eyes are watering from a slight burning sensation and something starts to stink…

Posted in Wiretapping & Surveillance, Identity Management, Biometrics, Security Measures, North America, Politics | 1 Comment »

March 18 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The Toronto Star has published an article that shows yet another facet of wiretapping - the impact the use of the tool has on the Ontario judicial system. It’s very encouraging that topics in security are finally receiving analysis from a variety of angles as opposed to the most prevalent ”security versus privacy” arguments which leave little room for solid assessment of measures. Of course, we still have a long way to go in, what should only be viewed as a necessary, rethinking of national security. 

For far too long national security has been a very hush-hush topic. Security was regarded as an area the law abiding public need not concern itself with, or so they were encouraged, and thus they left it to a handful of specialists chiefly from the law enforcement, intelligence and military communities. Questioning approaches to security was strongly discouraged among the ranks of those who were responsible for security and at times was utterly ignored when such concern arose from the public. This does not make for the best environment to encourage innovation that can take the concept of security into a new era.

We are, however, now at a potential national security crossroads. We could choose to stop the rush on a number of national security measures that only seek to enhance traditional approaches, thoroughly assess the usefulness of those approaches and take from them what we can in the development of new measures. Or, we could choose to continue down this path of stringing up cameras, issuing expensive hi-tech identity documents and opening up the gates to ever more wiretapping. The long-term implications of the latter are very grave.

Although few seem to realize it yet our current approaches to national security, far from having the intended effect of increasing stability, will actually lead to growing insecurity long-term. Taking a step back to consider the situation from a broader perspective this conclusion becomes apparent.

The closed in nature of the security community has not only stifled innovation, but it has also led to an “us versus them” perspective. This is a mindset that has caused a segment of the industry to feel that they are the law and are somehow separate and apart from the masses. Fortunately, the majority in the field do still have the best interest of the public at heart and work tirelessly to keep us safe. However, this brotherhood which develops as a result of the burden to protect also fosters a “we know what’s best” mentality that causes a sort of blindness in the leadership of the security industry. Thus, there is a tendency to push ahead almost bullishly measures that the security community believes appropriate, indeed, the only answer.

The public, on the other hand, readily accepts that those people who opt to put their lives on the line for the sake of the greater whole deserve respect. And rightly so. As a result, the public is happy to let the security industry decide for itself, quietly in back rooms, the future of security measures. Thus, with no questions asked enhancements to existing measures such as wiretapping or passports are accepted by the public. If the specialists tell us we need it, then we must. 

Unfortunately, we forget that those in the security profession are still humans. Despite the professional role assumed, humans (whether they be police officers, intelligence agents, soldiers or bureaucrats) are still susceptible to the same vices and sins as the average person. So, in the absence of demand from outside of the security sector, little to no proper analysis has been done on measures such as wiretapping or hi-tech identity documents that can prove that enhancements to existing approaches will, in fact, increase security. This, of course, will not stop the measure from being implemented.

Once something goes wrong, however, the public will suddenly be enraged. Demanding that the agency responsible be held accountable. Given the closed-mentality so characteristic of the security industry,  the response will be typical - cold and offended - how can you even ask, we slave to protect you! (If you think this exaggerated, consider the recent responses by some Canadian law enforcement agencies to taser incidents.) Rates of such response-reaction between the public and the security profession will only increase as the ineffectiveness of enhanced traditional approaches is revealed. Over time, the public will turn away from the security establishment with mistrust.

The impact on the state of security will be catastrophic. Despite the closed-in mentality of the security profession, success in the field is dependent on the symbiosis between law enforcement and a co-operative public.  It’s a relationship built on trust and respect - lose it and suddenly the security establishment will find itself wondering just who is it trying to protect? After all, humans are still animals with survival instincts. Should they feel that the system is not protecting them from real threats they will take matters into their own hands - and have done so very recently.

This isn’t our only option. As I mentioned earlier, we now sit at a crossroads where there is another direction open to us. We could open national security up to a wider debate, bringing in thinkers and experts from a variety of backgrounds to conduct assessments of individual existing measures as well as systemic analysis around security on which we can build strategic plans and measures. What better way to secure a society, than to have the society secure itself?

The choice is ours. 

Posted in Identity Management, Wiretapping & Surveillance, Biometrics, Security Measures, North America | 1 Comment »

March 17 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

Social Technologies issued a news release last week offering its vision of the future of security involving the use of emerging technologies. While the analysis provided a clear and realistic picture of the direction in which the western world is headed in terms of national security, it (like most coverage on the subject matter) failed to dig deeper asking why we find ourselves in such a state of insecurity in the first place?

If an uniformed observer were to suddenly take up the topic of national security they might be surprised to find a limited discussion on something so important it could soon impact our every movement. He or she would undoubtedly find an extremely polarized argument with security buffs shouting “if only we could convince the masses that increased hi-tech surveillance is the only answer” on one side and the privacy advocates on the other screaming “Big Brother”. Thus, would the now confused observer be left with but two options - accept a future of ever-more minute surveillance in the name of stability or vehemently oppose the tightening grasp of a government that has already proved itself untrustworthy. Neither approach is very conducive in the long-term to maintaining whatever degree of security possible -  in fact, both will probably only make our fragile Western world more unstable.

The problem is this, although most Westerners seem complacent today and eagerly give up civil liberties in the name of security, they aren’t as unobservant as some would think. Should authorities continue to press for increased surveillance of the masses and not actually provide the heightened state of security promised, not only will those segments of society that are already criminal increase their unlawful activity, but prepare for those law abiding segments to take matters into their own hands, turning ever-more away from the law enforcement and government that seems now so desperate to secure its hold over the people. It’s a risky game the security profession now plays with stable society, failing to address the root causes of insecurity while layering on intrusive “security” measures that aren’t well thought out.

In the defence of my profession, which given the nature of many of the solutions now hyped (biometrics, new and improved CCTV systems, dragnet wiretapping etc) has been widely seen as the key conspiratorial implementer of George Orwell’s prophecies, national security is a new field full of wrinkles needing ironed out. The industry is full of stale thinking, and no wonder, the field is mostly comprised of former law enforcement and intelligence officers, defence-turned-security analysts and increasingly high-tech specialists. Those who profess some fundamental understanding of security were schooled exclusively in how to manage a situation or crime only after it has occurred. Those who were schooled in preventative measures tend to have tactics involving brute force, surveillance and psychological warfare applied mainly to enemy populations. And finally, those who develop the technology are driven by the market, producing tools that fit the needs of their clients not necessarily making solutions designed to actually increase security, but facilitate existing approaches. Given these limitations, the industry shouldn’t really be expected to come up with the proactive solutions we need that won’t threaten our way of life, which was once thought to be freedom.

The government, which had been widely believed to have the interest of the people at heart, fails to provide the objective analysis needed to prevent the implementation of poorly thought out national security measures. It’s difficult to take on such a role when those employed by the various departments responsible include the above security experts and a smattering of career-bureaucrats who are notoriously under-informed on core subject matter. Furthermore, as is the case with almost every government file, from foreign affairs to education to health care, there is a total lack of strategic and systemic analysis, meaning issues are only individually addressed without ever fully understanding how that problem fits into the greatly whole.

As a result, we have rapid uptake of hi-tech national identity documents without any solid analysis of how such an undertaking will effectively increase security. The security industry develops and endorses the idea, the government readily agrees and the people are told it’s a good thing, it will be more difficult for official documents to be forged. Meanwhile, it isn’t the forgery rate that truly threatens our security, it’s the possibility of terrorists crossing our borders (or so we are told). If terrorists are really as well organized as it is claimed, then certainly they will not risk entering a country with cheap, forged documents. Indeed, there are better ways to breach border security legitimately:

1. Find a domestic citizen who has no criminal background to carry out the attack;
2. Assume a deceased citizen’s identity, acquire the necessary supporting documents and apply for the official documents thereby living under an official identity illegitimately; or
3. Acquire a legitimate identity from a country sponsoring terrorism.

How fancy micro-chipped identity documents will answer any of the above threats, I don’t know. Do expect, however, increased wait times at border crossings as agents and travellers struggle to adopt the technology and suffer slow database verification speeds (that is to say, if the traveller is being checked against a wider system and not just against the document in hand). Be aware that automated kiosks that allow travellers to verify their own documents just made it that much easier for a nervous suspect to cross the border. And, perhaps 5 to 10 years down the road, anticipate a very angry public that after having bought into the costly national security measures now being implemented found themselves even more vulnerable to the threat of terrorism and other crime. Moreover, those angry mobs will have lost their faith in a system that continuously sold them empty promises.

Wouldn’t it just have been better to begin asking why we find ourselves with increasing stability in the first place? Why we are the target of terrorism? Or how the break down of families and communities might be contributing to increasing rates of crime? Or perhaps how our “correctional system” fails to correct criminal tendencies? Answering these, and many more, questions objectively (meaning outside of the government and beyond the reach of market influence) are far more likely the key to increasing security than cameras and biometrics.

Posted in Identity Management, Wiretapping & Surveillance, Biometrics, Security Measures, North America | No Comments »

March 10 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

Is there a day that goes by where yet another useless “security” measure isn’t announced somewhere in the world? National biometric ID card schemes, unlimited dragnet wiretapping, CCTV cameras everywhere and anywhere - and to what avail? None of these measures will actually increase security. Traditional reactionary approaches can barely keep up with apprehending criminals after the fact, how can they be expected to prevent crime and terrorism simply because the measure is expanded or put into more widespread use? Whatever happened to the idea of quality over quantity, anyway? There must be some global department whose sole responsibilities it is to develop useless measures and brand them as “security”.

Clearly, the TTC has access to its recommendation as the commission recently announced its plans to implement 10,000 cameras in trains, streetcars and buses across the city in addition to the existing 1,500 at a cost of $21 million. Apparently, the system will not be monitored and, assures TTC chairman Adam Giambrone, only the police will have access to the footage. 

So, what’s the point of the system?

If the system is to act as a deterrent, as in the little signs posted near the camera telling people “you’re on camera” cause would-be criminals to rethink their actions, then expect only rebellious suburban teens to be deterred. As a result, the drop in crime rate due to the use of these cameras will be negligible, at best. Psychopaths, pathological criminals, drunks and terrorists won’t care about the cameras, only “normal” people who carefully consider odds and consequences will find themselves unnerved by the constant watch.

Besides, with no one there to actually apprehend criminals (and apparently no one manning the cameras), how useful is the system even after the fact? In terms of solving crimes, CCTV cameras have proven to be very ineffective as upwards of 80% of the images are of such poor quality that accurate identification cannot be made. Rendering the system considerably ineffective.

Of course, if the headlines are any indication CCTV does offer something - unlimited fulfillment of human fascinations with brutality, murder and sex. Just think, Toronto too will now be able to offer headlines of the latest act of public sex or murder caught on camera with its 72 million hours of CCTV footage taped a year! Seen in that light, it’s no wonder why Giambrone told the Toronto Star ”It would be unusual if only Toronto were segregated when every major city with a transit authority has a surveillance system.” Who wants to miss out on that blockbuster opportunity?

As a security analyst, however, I’d appreciate it if those implementing systems like CCTV would start labelling them more appropriately, as sensationalist measures, for example. All of these attempts to push measures through under the very serious guise of security is giving our profession a bad name.  

Posted in Identity Management, Wiretapping & Surveillance, Biometrics, North America | No Comments »

March 10 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

ZDNet News published the following update on U.K. ID card plans:

“Home secretary Jacqui Smith also announced on Thursday that compulsory ID cards for all British citizens may now be delayed until 2015, subject to a future Parliamentary vote.

But the government still intends to force foreign nationals living in Britain to register their biometric details on the National Identity Register and carry an ID card by the end of this year.

Smith also set out plans to issue ID cards to people working in airports and other high security-risk areas from next year, a plan that has come under fire from trade unions.

After that the target is students and young people, who will voluntarily have the option of registering for an ID card from 2010.

Anyone renewing or applying for a new passport from 2011 onwards will be required to add their biometric details to the National Identity Register, but they won’t now be forced to pay for a physical ID card and can instead choose to just use their passport.

The government estimates the combined cost of getting a biometric passport and ID card would be around £100.

For the few who are likely to actually want a standalone biometric ID card, they will also have the option of paying to get one without getting a new passport.

The latest ID card consultation plans also reveal that people will face fines of up to £1,000 for missing appointments to register their biometric details on the National Identity Register.”

Why so few people seem to have realized the futility of using identity cards as a preventative measure in the “war on terrorism” is beyond me. Identity as a basis for national security measures is only as solid as identity is fixed. Biometric identifiers cannot and will not truly make identity a firm concept - how can it? A fingerprint or an iris scan can just as well be attached to a fraudulent official identity as to a legitimate one. Makes one wonder, what’s the point?

Posted in Identity Management, Biometrics, Europe, Politics | No Comments »

March 4 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

Anyone interested in the different types of Identity Theft should read Lanny Britnell’s article entitled “The Changing Face of Identity Theft” originally published in the American Chronicle. In it, the author outlines several types including, “True Name”, Medical, Criminal and Synthetic Identity Theft.

Posted in Identity Management, Cyber Crime, North America | No Comments »