March 31 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The CIA chief, Michael Hayden, has reportedly told NBC that terrorists are using “operatives that…wouldn’t attract your attention if they were going through the customs line at Dulles  with you.” In other words, the new terrorist will look as Western as any citizen of North America. This should have been expected, particularly after the U.S. began using racial profiling as a border security measure; the next logical step in facilitating the crossing of potential terrorists at borders would be to use people who would never cause a red flag to be raised.

As with previous statements by CIA representatives regarding the vulnerability of power grids in North America, I’m left wondering at the quality of intelligence that they choose to share with the public. It’s as if the organization has been stockpiling the most obvious vulnerabilities or threat adaptations to security measures for release some 4 to 5  years after the bit of ‘intelligence,’ (if something so elementary can even be called that,) should have been news. Is the CIA trying to give the illusion that it is informing the public? Any thinking person should have been able to surmise this change in tactic for moving operatives across borders years ago.

It all comes back to the fundamental problem of using identity as the basis for security measures. Sure, keeping track of law abiding citizens is facilitated by identity management on a national scale; to such people the idea of abusing the system is outside their realm of contemplation. Preventing threats, such as terrorists, from crossing borders with identity based security measures isn’t so likely. In order to stop such a person from passing through a border check point, one would have to be aware that the target in fact poses a threat. Thus, only if the person is known to have committed a crime and can be firmly linked to the identity under which that crime was committed will such a suspect be apprehended.

Of course, an alert and well-trained border guard could detect slight peculiarities in a subject’s behaviour that might tip the agent off, thus escalating the case in the required 60-seconds or less. Our growing penchant for throwing technology at security problems, however, is making this scenario less and less likely all the time as we opt for automated kiosks to scan passports, manned by travellers far from the prying eyes of such adept officials.

Terrorists, and indeed organized criminals, understand how the system works.  In fact, it is generally accepted that such threats are already steps ahead of the security industry - particularly in the use of technology. Organized crime rings have readily adopted advanced technology, just as any other business has, greatly improving the efficiency of their operations. College ICT students have become prime candidates for working with such criminal organizations, particularly in regions where legitimate jobs  in the field are few or compensation is poor. If there is a way to forge hi-tech identity documents, I’m pretty sure that organized crime rings have already figured it out.

It isn’t the technological nature of enhanced identity-based national security measures which presents terrorists and mobsters with an opportunity to breach the walls of Fortress America, however; it’s the inherent flaws of the traditional system. Knowing that the system is designed to detect identifiable threats, i.e. known criminals or people who fit set profiles - for which there is none available for a terrorist - why would any well-organized crime ring send anyone across a border that would raise alarm? They wouldn’t. As a result, look for middle-class, Caucasian North Americans disgruntled by a lack of options, crumbling economy and perhaps with the scars of some distant war to bear as a far more likely candidate for terrorism in the coming years.

All of this, of course, is to say nothing of the other ways in which identity-based border security measures can be breached, which advanced technological solutions have failed to address. Such tactics include bribing a corrupt official to issue a legitimate albeit false identity, establishing an official identity using supporting documents issued to a target but linked to a deceased citizen, and operating under a legitimate identity issued by another state for the purposes of espionage or terrorism.

It makes me wonder what the point of the Chief’s statement are. On one hand, if reading between the lines, Mr. Hayden has admitted that our current identity-based approaches won’t be sufficient for the changing tactics of terrorists. On the other hand, taking his statements at face value, the fact that we know terrorists understand how the system can be breached easily will likely only result in ever-more enhanced traditional security measures; measures that although already evidently not effective for preventive purposes, will undoubtedly come into more widespread use. Indeed, the middle class Caucasian might just have been given a new reason to be screened and monitored, even more than before. 

Posted in Wiretapping & Surveillance, Identity Management, Security Measures, North America, Middle East, Central Asia | No Comments »

January 25 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The Sina-English News has reported that a new Peking-Hamburg express train has made its arrival in the German city January 24th following a 15-day test run. Its arrival marks the creation of an alternative to the Indian Ocean shipping route which takes a minimum of 40-days.

This new train route has been made possible through the agreement of China, Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany. The following picture was originally published the Manager-Magazin:

Marking what could be considered the revival of the silk road, the new train service is the beginning in a series of efforts to develop the Eurasian shipping corridor, which will significantly change how goods move across the massive land-mass.

Don’t worry North America, you still have a chance to get in on this development by means of the Arctic Bridge…

Posted in Asia, Central Asia, Europe | No Comments »

November 27 2007 by The Systemic Analyst.

Here is an interesting article by Michael Berk, originally published in the National Post:

“When Russian explorers planted a flag on the Arctic seabed earlier this year, they set off a chorus of howls from Canada, Denmark, the United States and Norway — all making claims of ownership. But if Canada really wants the maple leaf taken seriously in the Great White North, we must drop our “baby steps” strategy and do something… sensibly Canadian.

Coincidentally, one such sensible strategy to build our presence in the Arctic would do more than open the door to untold billions in trade between Canada and the rapidly emerging economies of Eurasia. It would also provide a clear route — through Churchill, Man. — for the integration of Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia into the global economy. That economic integration would do more to stabilize the region than Canadian forces ever can.

The Churchill-to-Kandahar route is not an easy one to see at first glance, but each leg of the journey makes sense locally and fits into a global context that can result in the greatest geopolitical and economic advance of the 21st century.

Churchill is Canada’s only Arctic deep-water seaport; a crucial shipping point for goods between North America, Europe and Asia. As part of an Arctic Bridge, Churchill is ready for its role on the global stage. Connecting to Murmansk, an ice-free seaport in the extreme northwest of Russia, Churchill could become an end point for the shortest shipping route between North America and rapidly developing Eurasian markets, such as Russia, China and India. Shipping via the Churchill-to-Murmansk Arctic Bridge is nine days faster than the St. Lawrence Seaway passage– a huge competitive advantage.

Last month, the federal and Manitoba governments agreed to invest in rail and port improvements to Churchill — a modest first step. The vision is that, in conjunction with other North American transportation infrastructure projects, goods would enter Churchill and be moved through Manitoba to the U.S. Midwest, and if desired into Mexico. Thus, Canada becomes an essential and desirable link between North American and Eurasian markets.

At the same time, Churchill would play an even bigger role in Canadian attempts to assert sovereignty over the Arctic, as infrastructure projects create jobs, promote regional development and increase the level of our activities in the North. Furthermore, the development of Arctic shipping routes will bring many countries to the negotiating table, which would increase dialogue over confrontation.

With the Arctic Bridge connecting North America, Europe and Eurasia in an unprecedented manner, the impetus for the construction of a Eurasian land bridge — ground transportation routes connecting Central Asia to itself and the rest of the world–becomes enormous.

At present, about US$600-billion worth of goods are shipped from Asia to Europe each year, only 1% of which is moved over inland transit routes. Developing common Eurasian transportation routes is a top priority for many countries in the region, as trade volume is expected to bolster both local economies and security co-operation.”

Posted in Central Asia | No Comments »