March 18 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

Peter Worthington has published a great article on Kosovo that sheds some light on a complicated situation:

“NATO’s big blunder: Action in Kosovo one of the great outrages of our time

Last Thursday, at the Royal Canadian Military Institute in Toronto, a gathering sponsored by Lord Byron Society discussed Kosovo declaring independence from Serbia.

This is an esoteric topic of limited concern to those not familiar with Balkan politics. It is one of the great outrages of our times, and certainly the most scandalous and unnecessary adventure of the presidency of Bill Clinton, who unleashed his incompetent Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to declare war on Serbia and persuaded NATO to join in.

Albright and the Clinton administration were persuaded that genocide was under way in Kosovo against Albanian Muslims who constituted a majority of the population.

The spectre of massacres and mass graves resulted in the 1999 decision to bomb Serbia into submitting to a more independent, multicultural Kosovo.

It was predicted by those who advocated war, that within 48 hours of being bombed, Serbia (Belgrade and Slobodan Milosevic) would capitulate and Kosovo would be free. Serbs, however, were made of sterner stuff than NATO and Washington anticipated, and the bombing lasted 78 days.

In the end, Kosovo technically remained a province of Serbia under UN jurisdiction. As for genocide and mass graves — that was a hoax. Nothing was found.

Atrocities, yes, roughly divided among Serbs and Albanians — the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). But not one mass grave.

It was eventually estimated that four times the number of Kosovo civilians died under NATO bombs, than had been killed by Serbs. The “war,” was largely the product of Kosovo Albanians provoking Serbs into retaliatory action, and having a willing international press — and U.S./NATO staff — eager to document what they were told.Jamie Shea, NATO’s spokesman, announced that some 100,000 Kosovars were missing, unaccounted for, and probably slaughtered. NATO later reduced this estimate to 10,000.

Winnipeg forensic pathologist Dr. Peter Markestyn was one of those designated to investigate and conduct forensic examinations. His team performed 1,800 autopsies. “That’s it,” he said. Hardly genocide.War crime prosecutor Louise Arbour — Albright’s choice for the job — did her bit by charging Milosevic with genocide and war crimes. She and the U.S. believed he was responsible for a massacre at the village of Racak, in January, 1999, when Serbs supposedly massacred 45 Muslim Albanians.William Walker, head of the Kosovo Verification Mission, visited the site and called it “an unspeakable atrocity … a crime against humanity … the worst I’ve ever seen.”

Skeptical French journalists investigated, and discovered that the bodies of KLA fighters who’d been killed while fighting, were dragged to the ditch, mutilated, some decapitated, and presented as massacred by Serbs.Finnish pathologists found it odd that little blood was in the ditch, and many had been shot at random, rather than executed. In other words it was a phony massacre, aimed at framing the Serbs.

To some it was mindful of Bosnian Muslims in Sarejevo mortaring market places and blaming Serbs — and getting away with it. Fortunately for Arbour’s reputation, Milosevic died before facing trial for Kosovo war crimes, else he’d likely have been acquitted.

The Kosovo war was staged and unnecessary — the U.S. and NATO hoodwinked into attacking. None of this suggests that Serbs were choirboys in the Balkans. Horrendous atrocities occurred.

Today, the Bush administration and European Union recognize Kosovo’s Independence. Russia and it allies do not. Nor does Serbia.

Realistically, there’s no way to right what was clearly a wrong, but at very least the truth of what happened should be recognized — which is what the meeting at the Military Institute on Thursday was all about.”

Posted in North America, Europe, Politics | No Comments »

March 18 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The Toronto Star has published an article that shows yet another facet of wiretapping - the impact the use of the tool has on the Ontario judicial system. It’s very encouraging that topics in security are finally receiving analysis from a variety of angles as opposed to the most prevalent ”security versus privacy” arguments which leave little room for solid assessment of measures. Of course, we still have a long way to go in, what should only be viewed as a necessary, rethinking of national security. 

For far too long national security has been a very hush-hush topic. Security was regarded as an area the law abiding public need not concern itself with, or so they were encouraged, and thus they left it to a handful of specialists chiefly from the law enforcement, intelligence and military communities. Questioning approaches to security was strongly discouraged among the ranks of those who were responsible for security and at times was utterly ignored when such concern arose from the public. This does not make for the best environment to encourage innovation that can take the concept of security into a new era.

We are, however, now at a potential national security crossroads. We could choose to stop the rush on a number of national security measures that only seek to enhance traditional approaches, thoroughly assess the usefulness of those approaches and take from them what we can in the development of new measures. Or, we could choose to continue down this path of stringing up cameras, issuing expensive hi-tech identity documents and opening up the gates to ever more wiretapping. The long-term implications of the latter are very grave.

Although few seem to realize it yet our current approaches to national security, far from having the intended effect of increasing stability, will actually lead to growing insecurity long-term. Taking a step back to consider the situation from a broader perspective this conclusion becomes apparent.

The closed in nature of the security community has not only stifled innovation, but it has also led to an “us versus them” perspective. This is a mindset that has caused a segment of the industry to feel that they are the law and are somehow separate and apart from the masses. Fortunately, the majority in the field do still have the best interest of the public at heart and work tirelessly to keep us safe. However, this brotherhood which develops as a result of the burden to protect also fosters a “we know what’s best” mentality that causes a sort of blindness in the leadership of the security industry. Thus, there is a tendency to push ahead almost bullishly measures that the security community believes appropriate, indeed, the only answer.

The public, on the other hand, readily accepts that those people who opt to put their lives on the line for the sake of the greater whole deserve respect. And rightly so. As a result, the public is happy to let the security industry decide for itself, quietly in back rooms, the future of security measures. Thus, with no questions asked enhancements to existing measures such as wiretapping or passports are accepted by the public. If the specialists tell us we need it, then we must. 

Unfortunately, we forget that those in the security profession are still humans. Despite the professional role assumed, humans (whether they be police officers, intelligence agents, soldiers or bureaucrats) are still susceptible to the same vices and sins as the average person. So, in the absence of demand from outside of the security sector, little to no proper analysis has been done on measures such as wiretapping or hi-tech identity documents that can prove that enhancements to existing approaches will, in fact, increase security. This, of course, will not stop the measure from being implemented.

Once something goes wrong, however, the public will suddenly be enraged. Demanding that the agency responsible be held accountable. Given the closed-mentality so characteristic of the security industry,  the response will be typical - cold and offended - how can you even ask, we slave to protect you! (If you think this exaggerated, consider the recent responses by some Canadian law enforcement agencies to taser incidents.) Rates of such response-reaction between the public and the security profession will only increase as the ineffectiveness of enhanced traditional approaches is revealed. Over time, the public will turn away from the security establishment with mistrust.

The impact on the state of security will be catastrophic. Despite the closed-in mentality of the security profession, success in the field is dependent on the symbiosis between law enforcement and a co-operative public.  It’s a relationship built on trust and respect - lose it and suddenly the security establishment will find itself wondering just who is it trying to protect? After all, humans are still animals with survival instincts. Should they feel that the system is not protecting them from real threats they will take matters into their own hands - and have done so very recently.

This isn’t our only option. As I mentioned earlier, we now sit at a crossroads where there is another direction open to us. We could open national security up to a wider debate, bringing in thinkers and experts from a variety of backgrounds to conduct assessments of individual existing measures as well as systemic analysis around security on which we can build strategic plans and measures. What better way to secure a society, than to have the society secure itself?

The choice is ours. 

Posted in Identity Management, Wiretapping & Surveillance, Biometrics, Security Measures, North America | 1 Comment »

March 18 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

The following article by Julian Sanchez published in the LA Times is a wonderful piece documenting the many instance throughout U.S. history that wiretaps have been abused. The fact of the matter is so long as humans are behind security measures expect abuses. Human beings (or at least a good percentage of them) have weaknesses and are often tempted to act in less than proper ways. We have to begin to accept this as a fundamental truth (indeed, haven’t most religions been teaching people this?) and take a more realistic approach to how we understand security measures and view the people behind them.

As the battle over reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act rages in Congress, civil libertarians warn that legislation sought by the White House could enable spying on “ordinary Americans.” Others, like Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), counter that only those with an “irrational fear of government” believe that “our country’s intelligence analysts are more concerned with random innocent Americans than foreign terrorists overseas.”

But focusing on the privacy of the average Joe in this way obscures the deeper threat that warrantless wiretaps pose to a democratic society. Without meaningful oversight, presidents and intelligence agencies can — and repeatedly have — abused their surveillance authority to spy on political enemies and dissenters.

The original FISA law was passed in 1978 after a thorough congressional investigation headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) revealed that for decades, intelligence analysts — and the presidents they served — had spied on the letters and phone conversations of union chiefs, civil rights leaders, journalists, antiwar activists, lobbyists, members of Congress, Supreme Court justices — even Eleanor Roosevelt and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. The Church Committee reports painstakingly documented how the information obtained was often “collected and disseminated in order to serve the purely political interests of an intelligence agency or the administration, and to influence social policy and political action.”

Political abuse of electronic surveillance goes back at least as far as the Teapot Dome scandal that roiled the Warren G. Harding administration in the early 1920s. When Atty. Gen. Harry Daugherty stood accused of shielding corrupt Cabinet officials, his friend FBI Director William Burns went after Sen. Burton Wheeler, the fiery Montana progressive who helped spearhead the investigation of the scandal. FBI agents tapped Wheeler’s phone, read his mail and broke into his office. Wheeler was indicted on trumped-up charges by a Montana grand jury, and though he was ultimately cleared, the FBI became more adept in later years at exploiting private information to blackmail or ruin troublesome public figures. (As New York Gov. Eliot Spitzer can attest, a single wiretap is all it takes to torpedo a political career.)

In 1945, Harry Truman had the FBI wiretap Thomas Corcoran, a member of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “brain trust” whom Truman despised and whose influence he resented. Following the death of Chief Justice Harlan Stone the next year, the taps picked up Corcoran’s conversations about succession with Justice William O. Douglas. Six weeks later, having reviewed the FBI’s transcripts, Truman passed over Douglas and the other sitting justices to select Secretary of the Treasury (and poker buddy) Fred Vinson for the court’s top spot.

“Foreign intelligence” was often used as a pretext for gathering political intelligence. John F. Kennedy’s attorney general, brother Bobby, authorized wiretaps on lobbyists, Agriculture Department officials and even a congressman’s secretary in hopes of discovering whether the Dominican Republic was paying bribes to influence U.S. sugar policy. The nine-week investigation didn’t turn up evidence of money changing hands, but it did turn up plenty of useful information about the wrangling over the sugar quota in Congress — information that an FBI memo concluded “contributed heavily to the administration’s success” in passing its own preferred legislation.

In the FISA debate, Bush administration officials oppose any explicit rules against “reverse targeting” Americans in conversations with noncitizens, though they say they’d never do it.

But Lyndon Johnson found the tactic useful when he wanted to know what promises then-candidate Richard Nixon might be making to our allies in South Vietnam through confidant Anna Chenault. FBI officials worried that directly tapping Chenault would put the bureau “in a most untenable and embarrassing position,” so they recorded her conversations with her Vietnamese contacts.

Johnson famously heard recordings of King’s conversations and personal liaisons with various women. Less well known is that he received wiretap reports on King’s strategy conferences with other civil rights leaders, hoping to use the information to block their efforts to seat several Mississippi delegates at the 1964 Democratic National Convention. Johnson even complained that it was taking him “hours each night” to read the reports.

Few presidents were quite as brazen as Nixon, whom the Church Committee found had “authorized a program of wiretaps which produced for the White House purely political or personal information unrelated to national security.” They didn’t need to be, perhaps. Through programs such as the National Security Agency’s Operation Shamrock (1947 to 1975), which swept up international telegrams en masse, the government already had a vast store of data, and presidents could easily run “name checks” on opponents using these existing databases.

It’s probably true that ordinary citizens uninvolved in political activism have little reason to fear being spied on, just as most Americans seldom need to invoke their 1st Amendment right to freedom of speech. But we understand that the 1st Amendment serves a dual role: It protects the private right to speak your mind, but it serves an even more important structural function, ensuring open debate about matters of public importance. You might not care about that first function if you don’t plan to say anything controversial. But anyone who lives in a democracy, who is subject to its laws and affected by its policies, ought to care about the second.

Harvard University legal scholar William Stuntz has argued that the framers of the Constitution viewed the 4th Amendment as a mechanism for protecting political dissent. In England, agents of the crown had ransacked the homes of pamphleteers critical of the king — something the founders resolved that the American system would not countenance.

In that light, the security-versus-privacy framing of the contemporary FISA debate seems oddly incomplete. Your personal phone calls and e-mails may be of limited interest to the spymasters of Langley and Ft. Meade. But if you think an executive branch unchecked by courts won’t turn its “national security” surveillance powers to political ends — well, it would be a first.

Julian Sanchez is a Washington writer who studies privacy and surveillance.

Posted in Wiretapping & Surveillance, North America, Politics | No Comments »