Losing Georgia: The Unravelling Of Eurasia Or Just The Beginning Of A Terrific Co-operative?

March 5 2008 by The Systemic Analyst.

Kosovo is independent, why can’t I be? - must be what South Ossetia is saying these days and perhaps rightfully so. Europe might have shot itself in the foot with the recent push to recognize Kosovo as the latest independent state on the block. In fact, it’s really unfortunate that the issue of Kosovo wasn’t dealt with sooner, (after all it’s been 8 years or more since the international community traipsed in), and in a much more appropriate manner (why is it that a Serbian minority is being trapped with another hostile nation, anyway?) At a time, too, when Europe with its strange tactic of absorbing eager countries into a greater continental herd seemed poised to assume world leadership from a floundering U.S., one has to wonder what the impact of separatism will be on the path to a potentially powerful Eurasian Co-operative? Certainly, regional skirmishes between ethnic groups will set that train off track or will they?

It will be interesting to watch world reaction to South Ossetia’s latest claim of independence. Unlike Kosovo, the Caucausus (at least where there is no oil) is a region that seems just about as easy for the West to ignore as Africa once was. Refugees won’t be spilling into the European Union as they did from former Yugoslavia. No one in the West really wants to see their ally, Georgia, torn apart by secessionism. About the only way that South Ossetia’s claims will receive any notice other than being brushed off is if Russia is dragged into it and cast as an evil interloper involved for its own gains. That could result in an ugly outcome and, given the penchant of Western media to unduly trash Russia, is a likely, if unnecessary, provocation of a growing power.

On the other hand should a country like the U.S. continue to support Georgia in this matter and, in so doing, attack Russia for its involvement the reaction could actually strengthen Eurasia. If, for example, Russia can provably keep out of what undoubtedly will be an escalating situation in South Ossetia despite any allegations, European countries (particularly those dependent on Russian energy) would be free and clear to align themselves with Russia on the matter insisting that South Ossetian independence could only occur through proper channels, effectively polarizing countries on eerily familiar axes.  Only this time, the groupings would be economically-based as opposed to ideological.

Should South Ossetia gain independence, it would mean the effective dissolution of modern Georgia, as certainly Abkhazia (which indeed already demanded independence as I was writing this article) and other breakaway regions would follow suit. Such a dissolution might not be a bad thing, at least in the context of fostering a greater Eurasia anyway, as it could encourage similar consensual integration in the region with Russia, à la European Union. Consensual integration could facilitate trade across the massive Eurasian continent. Of course, all of this is mere speculation and is highly dependent on how Russia is painted in the situation and choses to react. 

One thing is certain, however,  South Ossetia will have a hard time gaining independence, if it is ever achieved. High rates of intermarriage between Ossetians and Georgians, combined with a significant Georgian minority will make dividing the area up along ethnic lines difficult. Furthermore, Western insistence that referendums determining independence be sanctioned by the central Georgian government will make secession along legal lines challenging. Of course, there is also that very subjective catch of South Ossetia being considered an “integral part of the country”, meaning that without it the country cannot exist, which has prevented past external recognition of independence also. 

Originally from the Eurasian Steppes, the Ossetians were driven away from the Don river by the Mongols, migrating to the slopes of the Caucasus mountains in an area that straddles the Russian and Georgian borders. The Ossetic language is related to that of the Yaghnobi in Tajikistan and the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and is the only remaining Scythian branch of Eastern-Iranian languages and as such is Indo-European.

The Russian Empire took the region of North Ossetia in 1767 and has retained it ever since. South Ossetia was annexed by Russia in 1801 along with Georgia.

Following the February Revolution the Ossetians called for self-rule in areas where they held majorities - including North and South Ossetia. The Bolsheviks supported this pushing for South Ossetia to be incorporated into Russia. However, South Ossetia became part of the Menshevik Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1921) and North Ossetia became part of the Terek Soviet Republic (1918-1919).

From 1918-1920 the Ossetians staged a series of uprisings in Georgia. In 1918 the Ossetian peasants withheld taxes from the then Transcaucasus government and by March were engaged in a rebellion holding back the Georgian People’s Gaurd. The Mensheviks eventually repressed this revolt only to have the rebellion resurface in late 1919, it too was squashed.

The Bolsheviks backed yet another revolt in 1920 which helped rebels in the Java district overcome Georgian forces and was subsequently absorbed into Soviet Russia. Ever the strategist, Lenin favoured peace with Georgia and began “to distance himself from the Ossetian” cause. This led to a violent repression of the rebellion by Georgian forces.

In 1922 following the advance of the Red Army the year before, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (similar to a province) was created inside the Soviet Georgian Republic. Interestingly, ethnic Georgian villages were incorporated into this new oblast. The Soviet era brought with it a social calm between Ossetians and Georgians, as opposed the relations between the latter and Abkhazia. 

The late 1980’s, however, brought with it renewed tensions with the Ossetians claiming that the Georgians had committed genocide during the 1918-1920 period. In 1989 a group called the South Ossetian Popular Front began renewing demands for unification with North Ossetia. In November of that year, the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet approved a decision to unite, which was revoked by the Georgian government who subsequently abolished North Ossetia’s autonomy and repressed newspapers and demonstrations.

Georgian independence in 1991 brought with it increasing rates of nationalism.  Measures, such as making Georgian the only official language in a state where many different ethnic groups resided, sparked ethnic tensions in many areas of the country. Conflicts during this period resulted in 100,000 ethnic Ossetians fleeing to North Ossetia (who were resettled in areas that had been left unihabited by Stalin’s 1944 deportation of the Ingush leading to further conflict upon their return to the area.) and 23,000 ethnic Georgians fleeing to other parts of Georgia. A ceasefire was accepted by Georgia in 1992 to avoid war with Russia and peacekeeping mission was set up in 1992 and monitors sent by the OSCE. 

The first North Ossetian referendum on independence was held on January 19th, 1992. It was widely ignored by the international community. A second referendum was held on November 12th, 2006 in which 99% of voters chose independence. This referendum also went  unrecognized by the international community due to claims that ethnic Georgians did not participate and that the Georgian government did not approve the referendum. (Since when does the country from which the breakaway province have to seek approval - it seems to me that Kosovo certainly didn’t need Serbia’s.)

The current political climate is again tense following recent Georgian military build up in the region, due to alleged issues around smuggling.

Posted in Europe, Politics | No Comments »